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ABSTRACT
Recently, in Sci. Rep. 6 (2016) 28767, Li et al., have proposed a scheme for quantum key distribution using Bell states. This
comment provides a proof that the proposed scheme of Li et al., is insecure as it involves leakage of information. Further, it is
also shown that all the error rates computed in the Li et al.’s paper are incorrect as the authors failed to recognize the fact that
any eavesdropping effort will lead to entanglement swapping. Finally, it is established that Li et al.’s scheme can be viewed as
an incrementally (but incorrectly) modified version of the existing schemes based on Goldenberg Vaidman (GV) subroutine.
Recently, Li et al.1 have proposed a one step scheme for quantum key distribution (QKD) using a Bell states. The scheme
is not secure and the claims made by the authors unfortunately appear to be inaccurate for various reasons as elaborated in
this comment. Firstly, they claimed their scheme to be novel and tried to support their claim by stating “Compared with
the “Pingpong” protocol involving two steps, the proposed protocol does not need to store the qubit and only involves one
step”. This is a comparison of an apple with an orange, as the Pingpong protocol is designed for quantum secure direct
communication (QSDC), where information can be transmitted using quantum resources without the prior generation of keys.
Naturally, a scheme of QKD should not be compared with a scheme of QSDC. To visualize the naiveness of their claim and
part of the exercises followed in their paper, one may note that even the well known BB842 and B923 protocols for QKD do
not require quantum memory, if one wishes to design BB84 type scheme using EPR states, Alice can simply prepare some
copies of Bell states (say |φ+〉 = 1√2 (|00〉+ |11〉) = 1√2 (|++〉+ |−−〉), and send the second qubits of all the Bell pairs
to Bob, who subsequently randomly measures his qubit in X basis or Z basis. Alice also performs the same measurement
and they keep all those cases where the measurement basis used by them are the same. For eavesdropping check they may
compare half the results, if no signature for eavesdropping is found their key will be exactly correlated. A scheme equivalent
to this scheme, which is one step and uses EPR state, is discussed by some of the present authors as Protocol 2 in,4 where to
increase the efficiency, Bob used to announce his basis and Alice used to subsequently measure in the same basis. However,
such a scheme is neither efficient (as it uses costly quantum resource, like entanglement, which is not required) nor novel
(as the scheme is equivalent to BB84). The one step EPR-based scheme proposed by Li et al., is slightly different from this
simple minded EPR-based one step scheme of QKD described above as in this case Bob performs Bell measurement. In what
follows we would show that security of such a scheme appears from entanglement swapping. Unfortunately, Li et al., missed
this point and analyzed the security of their protocol in analogy with BB84 scheme, and naturally such an incorrect analysis
led to incorrect values of error rates. Before, we continue with our comments and analysis, for the sake of completeness of
this comment, we would like to briefly describe Li et al.’s protocol.
Analysis of Li et al.’s protocol
Let us first summarize the first QKD protocol of Li et al., which requires memory. In fact, the protocol is nothing but a
DSQC protocol proposed in the recent past by some of the present authors,5 where Alice is sending random bits instead of a
meaningful message. Specifically, Alice prepares a Bell state corresponding to each 2-bits of her key, i.e., |φ+〉, |φ−〉, |ψ+〉
and |ψ−〉 for sending 00, 01, 10, 11, respectively. This can also be viewed as Alice preparing N2 copies of |φ+〉 and applying
Pauli operations I, Z, X and iY to encode 00, 01, 10, 11, respectively. Subsequently, she permutes the string of encoded
particles and sends it to Bob, who uses memory to store the qubits other than decoy qubits. They proceed for final key
generation only if the channel is ensured safe. It is worth noting here that a QKD protocol can be modified to a direct
communication protocol by incorporating memory, whereas a direct communication protocol can always be converted to a
QKD protocol if the sender sends random key rather sending a meaningful message.
The second protocol is a modification of the first protocol to circumvent the use of memory. Specifically, the authors tried
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to design an entangled-state-based protocol in analogy with BB84 protocol, where Alice prepares two Bell states for each
4-bits of her secret key and probabilistically swap the second particle of the first Bell state with the first particle of the second
Bell state (or in other words, arrange the 4 particles in one of the following orders {(1,2) ,(3,4)} or {(1,3) ,(2,4)} , where the
particles (1,2) and (3,4) are entangled with each other). This probabilistic swap is equivalent to a restricted randomization
process that does not allow all possible permutations, for example, it does not allow {(1,4) ,(2,3)} as a valid sequence. Thus,
it leaves only two choices for Bob, i.e., either to measure the string as such ({(1,2) ,(3,4)}) or after swapping second and
third qubits in the string ({(1,3) ,(2,4)}). After repeating this procedure for all the key bits, Alice and Bob first check some
of the decoy qubits, and if errors are low they proceed to key generation.
In both the schemes proposed in Ref.1 and summarized here, the authors claimed that the security arises due to Heisen-
berg’s uncertainty principle and no-cloning. However, it should be noted that the security in a cryptographic protocol is
achieved using splitting the useful information in 2 or more pieces, in such a way that unavailability of all these pieces makes
it impossible to extract the secret.5 For example, in BB84 protocol, Alice sends the quantum piece (qubits) to Bob and with-
holds classical information regarding choice of basis for each qubit. Similarly, in the present protocols, Alice withholds the
classical information of order of permutation. This principle of origin of security due to temporal or spatial separation of
entangled particles causing ignorance for an eavesdropper has been discussed in the past as GV subroutine in Refs.5–8 In GV
subroutine, if Eve incorrectly chooses particles from two entangled states to measure in the basis they were initially prepared,
then it causes entanglement swapping, which leaves detectable traces for the receiver. Interestingly, its equivalence with BB84
subroutine, in which single qubits are used as decoy qubit, has also been addressed over noisy channels in the recent past.9
In GV subroutine and any other scheme, where particle order of entangled particles are permuted before transmitting through
the channel, eavesdropping efforts lead to entanglement swapping and thus a detectable trace of eavesdropping.
Interestingly, the authors completely missed the role of entanglement swapping, which is reflected in the erroneous com-
putation of error rates and mutual information. To visualize this point, let us look in Group 2 in Table 3 of Ref.;1 if Eve
selects the wrong pair of qubits to measure in the Bell basis that would have led to entanglement swapping. Specifically, due
to entanglement swapping, the initial choice of states |φ+〉12|ψ+〉34 would become
|φ+〉12|ψ+〉34 = 12 (|φ+〉13|ψ+〉24 + |φ−〉13|ψ−〉24 + |ψ+〉13|φ+〉24 + |ψ−〉13|φ−〉24) , (1)
which will never lead to a measurement outcome by Eve |ψ+〉13|ψ−〉24. Similarly, if Bob performs a measurement after
Eve’s measurement using an incorrect sequence that would never lead to |ψ+〉12|φ−〉34. To visualize this consider that
Eve’s measurement yields |φ+〉13|ψ+〉24 = 12 (|φ+〉12|ψ+〉34 + |φ−〉12|ψ−〉34 + |ψ+〉12|φ+〉34 + |ψ−〉12|φ−〉34), then a sub-
sequent measurement of Bob in a correct sequence would yield one of the following 4 possible results with equal probability:
|φ+〉12|ψ+〉34, |φ−〉12|ψ−〉34, |ψ+〉12|φ+〉34, |ψ−〉12|φ−〉34. Clearly, in this particular case, Bob cannot obtain |ψ+〉12|ψ−〉34.
Similarly, we can expand the other 3 possible outcomes of Eve’s measurement as
|φ−〉13|ψ−〉24 = 12 (|φ+〉12|ψ+〉34 + |φ−〉12|ψ−〉34−|ψ+〉12|φ+〉34−|ψ−〉12|φ−〉34) , (2)
|ψ+〉13|φ+〉24 = 12 (|φ+〉12|ψ+〉34−|φ−〉12|ψ−〉34 + |ψ+〉12|φ+〉34−|ψ−〉12|φ−〉34) , (3)
and
|ψ−〉13|φ−〉24 = 12 (|φ+〉12|ψ+〉34−|φ−〉12|ψ−〉34−|ψ+〉12|φ+〉34 + |ψ−〉12|φ−〉34) . (4)
Now, we can easily see that whatever be the measurement outcome of Eve, for an initial state |φ+〉12|ψ+〉34, Eve can never
obtain |ψ+〉12|φ−〉34. A similar mistake can also be observed in Group 3 of Table 4 of Ref.1 for Bob’s measurement.
From the above example, we can easily observe the following from the perspective of an eavesdropper. Half of the time
she chooses the correct order of particles, and consequently obtains the right bit values, without leaving any detectable trace
of her attack. However, in the remaining half of the cases (of the groups she intends to attack), she chooses the wrong order of
particles, her measurement causes entanglement swapping (as discussed through Eqs. (1)-(4)). It is worth noting here, still 1/4
of the times she obtains the correct result, while she obtains wrong results on the remaining 3/4 cases. Therefore, she obtains
the right bit values with probability 12
(
1+ 14
)
= 58 . For instance, suppose Alice initially prepares |φ+〉|ψ+〉 as discussed above
and sends it to Bob, but the transmitted state is intercepted by Eve and measured in the Bell basis. Half of the time, when she
chooses the correct particle order she obtains |φ+〉|ψ+〉, whereas in the remaining half of the cases her measurement would
cause entanglement swapping, but still Eve obtains the correct result (i.e., |φ+〉|ψ+〉) with 14 probability. Thus, in half of all
the cases, Bob obtains incorrect result (i.e., traces of eavesdropping) with 34 probability. Therefore, an eavesdropping attack
is detected with probability 12 × 34 = 38 . Similar analysis would lead to the same result for other initial states, too, and we can
easily observe that the value for the probability that Bob succeeds in detecting an eavesdropping attack (correct value 38 as
2/4
shown above) for a specific block of 4 qubits, which has been attacked by Eve is incorrectly computed in Ref.,1 where they
wrote, “ ... if Bob measures this intercepted Bell states with the same location Alice sent he gets a random Bell state result,
i.e., an incorrect result with probability of 1516 = 93.75%.” As
15
16 ≫ 38 , we can conclude that the values computed in Li et al.’s
paper are incorrect and exaggerated.
Now to illustrate the leakage involved in this protocol, let us look at the right hand sides of Eqs. (1)-(4), where we can see
that in each case, Eve obtains the correct result, i.e., the state prepared by Alice with probability 58 , while one of the 3 incorrect
outcomes with probability 18 each. It is noteworthy that out of the 4 bits of classical information that Alice sends to Bob, most
of it is leaked to Eve as her ignorance is only − 58 log2 58 − 3× 18 log2 18 = 1.54879 bits. Further, we note that in any realistic
attack strategy, Eve only attacks a fraction f of the transmitted qubits to reduce the chances of being detected. In the present
case, we may assume that Eve attacks m of the n blocks of transmitted qubits, where each block contains 4 qubits. Thus,
f = m
n
. Consequently, average information extracted by Eve for the fraction f of the transmitted blocks of qubits attacked by
her is
I (A : E) =
5 f
8 .
Similarly, the error due to Eve’s measurement, that is detected by Alice and Bob through a comparison is 3 f8 . Therefore,
the mutual information between Alice and Bob is
I (A : B) = 1−H
[
3 f
8
]
.
Here, H [u] corresponds to the Shannon binary entropy. A protocol qualifies as a secure communication protocol only if
I (A : B) ≥ I (A : E) which is ensured for f = 0.493875∼= 49.39%. Thus, tolerable error rate is emax = 38 × 49.39 = 18.52%.
Incidentally, Li et al.’s incorrect analysis led to a similar value (11%). However, it would be apt to note that the emax reported
here is valid only for a specific eavesdropping attack (measurement-resend attack), whereas for BB84 protocol, the same is
known tightly for an arbitrary attack and the tolerable error limit against an arbitrary attack in BB84 is 11%.10 Further, we
would like to note that under measurement resend attack, often higher values of emax is found. For example, for Goldenberg
Vaidman protocol11 emax was computed to be 0.26 = 26%.7 Finally, we would like to conclude this comment by noting that
there is a class of quantum cryptographic schemes where particle order permutation (PoP) technique is used (see6,7,12–15 and
references therein). This technique was introduced by Deng et al.16 and is frequently used by us and others.6,7,12–15 In the
set of all PoP based schemes, there is a subset of protocols, in which sender(s) initially create N2 copies of a Bell state and
after encoding her information (if needed) sends all the particles to Bob, but applies a permutation operator ΠN before sending
the sequence. Some of these Bell states are used as decoy qubits. Now, if Eve chooses, two qubits from the sequence that
is transmitted through the channel the probability that the selected qubit is entangled (i.e., the probability that he performs a
measurement in correct order) is only 2NC2 =
4
N(N−1) , and in that case I(A : E) =
4
N(N−1) × f × 54 = 5 fN(N−1) , which reduces
exponentially with N and approaches zero for large N. As I(A : E) reduces, I(A : B) increases and consequently emax increases.
This is in the heart of GV subroutine and PoP based schemes that uses Bell state (see our earlier works6,12,13 and references
therein). Thus, in Ref.,1 an effort has been made to slightly modify the existing PoP based schemes that use Bell state, without
citing any of them. However, the modification led to leakage and a lower tolerable error rate under measurement-resend attack.
Further, the main results of1 are wrong as the authors failed to recognize the role of entanglement swapping in their scheme.
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